病死猪处理行为的政府与养猪场户进化博弈及仿真分析

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Dead Pig Processing Behavior in Pig Farms and Government

  • 摘要: 养猪场户的病死猪处理行为对于改善猪肉质量安全和生猪养殖环境具有重要意义。本文运用进化博弈模型研究病死猪处理中政府与养猪场户策略选择的演进过程、稳定点及其影响因素。结果表明:政府和养猪场户病死猪处理策略的选择与政府监管成本、公众关注度、政府监管能力、政府消极监管的声誉损失、养猪场户病死猪无害化处理成本、政府补贴、病死猪的非法出售价格、养猪场户病死猪不当处理被发现概率、养猪场户病死猪不当处理的惩罚相关。进一步仿真结果表明:政府通过对实施病死猪无害化处理的养猪场户进行适度补贴、加大对养猪场户病死猪不当处理行为的惩罚、提高公众对猪肉质量安全的关注度等措施,可有效促进政府和养猪场户的病死猪处理策略收敛到理想均衡。

     

    Abstract: The dead pig handling behavior of pig farmers is of great significance for improving pork quality and safety and pig breeding environment. This paper used evolutionary game model to study the evolution, stability and influencing factors of government and pig farms' strategy choice in the process of handling pigs. The results showed that the government and pig farms' choice was related to government supervision costs, public attention, government supervision, reputation loss of government negative regulation, cost of innocent treatment of sick pig, government subsidies, the illegal sale price of sick pigs, the probability of improper handling of sick pigs in pig farms, punishment for improper handling of pigs killed in pig farms. The simulation results showed that the government can effectively promote the pig farms and the government treatment strategies to an ideal equilibrium by properly subsidizing pig farmers who have implemented the harmless treatment of dead pigs, increasing penalties for pig farms' improper handling of sick pigs, and raising public concern about pork quality and safety.

     

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