成本共担契约下生鲜农产品供应链融资策略优化研究

Research on the Optimization of Supply Chain Financing Strategies for Fresh Agricultural Products under the Cost-sharing Contract

  • 摘要: 基于由生鲜农产品供应商与电商平台构成的一个二级供应链,综合考虑供应商与电商平台分别提供保鲜服务和融资服务的行为,建立电商平台融资和银行融资模式下的Stackelberg博弈模型,并结合在有无引入成本分担契约的情况下,采用比较分析的方式,探讨电商融资模式相比于银行融资模式的最优运营策略及其对生鲜供应商和电商平台利润的影响。研究结果显示:当电商贷款利率和银行贷款利率满足一定关系时,生鲜供应商通过判断限定条件可以得到最佳的融资模式;成本共担契约可以给生鲜供应链系统带来更优的保鲜效果和利润;当贷款利率和成本分担比例同时满足某一范围时,生鲜供应商选择其中一种融资模式利润更优。最后通过数值实验对所建模型的合理性和有效性进行分析并得出结论。

     

    Abstract: Based on a secondary supply chain composed of fresh agricultural product suppliers and e-commerce platforms, taking into account the behavior of suppliers and e-commerce providing fresh-keeping services and financing services respectively, establishes the Stackelberg game model under the e-commerce financing and bank financing models, and discusses the optimal operation strategy of the e-commerce financing model compared with the bank financing model and its impact on the profits of fresh suppliers and e-commerce by means of comparative analysis with or without the introduction of cost-sharing contracts, and using the method of comparative analysis to explore the optimal operational strategy of the e-commerce financing model compared to the bank financing model and its impact on the profitability of fresh food suppliers and e-commerce platforms. The results of the study show that when the interest rate of e-commerce and bank interest rate meet a certain relationship, the fresh food suppliers can get the best financing model by judging the qualifying conditions; the cost-sharing contract can bring better preservation efforts and profits to the fresh food supply chain system; when the loan interest rate and cost-sharing ratio meet a certain range at the same time, the fresh food suppliers can get better profits by choosing one of the financing models. Finally, the rationality and validity of the proposed model are analyzed by numerical experiments and conclusions are drawn.

     

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